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Abstract 
 
This paper analyses farmers’ behavioural responses to Government attempts to 
reduce the risk of disease transmission from badgers to cattle through badger 
vaccination. Evidence for two opposing behavioural adaptions is examined in 
response to the vaccination of badgers to reduce the risk of transmission to farmed 
cattle. Risk compensation theory suggests that interventions that reduce risk, such as 
vaccination, are counterbalanced by negative behavioural adaptions. By contrast, the 
spillover effect suggests that interventions can prompt further positive behaviours. 
The paper uses data from a longitudinal mixed methods study of farmers’ attitudes to 
badger vaccination to prevent the spread of bovine tuberculosis, their reports of 
biosecurity practices, and cattle movement data in 5 areas of England, one of which 
experienced badger vaccination. Analysis finds limited evidence of spillover 
behaviours following vaccination. Lack of spillover is attributed to farmers’ beliefs in 
the effectiveness of biosecurity and the lack of similarity between badger vaccination 
and vaccination for other animal diseases. Risk compensation behaviours are 
associated with farmers’ beliefs as to who should manage animal disease. Rather 
than farmers’ belief in vaccine effectiveness, it is more likely that farmers’ low sense 
of being able to do anything to prevent disease influences their apparent risk 
compensation behaviours. These findings address the gap in the literature relating to 
farmers' behavioural adaptions to vaccine use in the management of animal disease. 
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1. Introduction 1	
 2	
Risk compensation theory suggests that initiatives to reduce risk are 3	
counterbalanced by greater risk taking [1, 2]. Studies of post-vaccination behaviour 4	
suggest an association with risk compensation behaviours [3-5]. By contrast, 5	
concerns that Human Papillomavirus vaccination may promote increased sexual 6	
activity [6] have been shown to be false [7, 8]. Vaccination may also act as a ‘wedge’ 7	
[9] to drive the adoption of additional risk reduction behaviours, known as the 8	
‘spillover effect’ [10, 11]. Behavioural spillovers are associated with pre-natal care 9	
and post-natal vaccination choices [12], and more generally, environmental practices 10	
such as purchasing organic food, recycling, waste minimisation, and transport 11	
choices [10, 13, 14]. However, positive behavioural spillovers may act to legitimise 12	
other negative behaviours [15] or they may be limited by low ‘self-efficacy’ [16]: 13	
feelings of fatalism and being unable to prevent ill-health or disease. 14	
 15	
Whilst vaccination is connected to both these behavioural adaptions, there are no 16	
studies of risk compensation or behavioural spillovers in relation to the use of animal 17	
disease vaccines. This is surprising because the pre-conditions for risk 18	
compensation suggested by Hedlund [1] apply equally to animal keepers, such as 19	
farmers, as to the general public. These include: the intervention must be visible; 20	
have an effect on risk perception; there must be a motivation to increase risk taking 21	
(for example, economic incentives); and individuals have the ability to adapt their 22	
behaviour (as opposed to being restricted by regulation). Expected and unexpected 23	
positive, negative and neutral behavioural responses to animal disease interventions 24	
should therefore be anticipated [17].  25	
 26	
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Given the potential consequences of these behavioural adaptions to animal disease 27	
management, it is imperative to determine the conditions in which such behavioural 28	
adaptions occur, yet there are few studies of risk compensation and/or behavioural 29	
spillover in the animal disease management literature. The aim of this paper is 30	
therefore to examine farmers’ behavioural responses to policies designed to reduce 31	
the risk of transmission of bovine tuberculosis (bTB) from wildlife to cattle. Despite 32	
the volume of epidemiological research on the transmission of bTB, there have been 33	
no studies examining the impact of wildlife interventions on farmer behaviour. The 34	
paper therefore addresses this gap in the literature by examining the extent and 35	
reasons for risk compensation and spillover behaviours amongst farmers in areas 36	
where wildlife have been vaccinated to prevent the spread of disease, with those in 37	
comparison areas.  38	
 39	
2. Materials and Methods 40	
 41	
2. 1 Background: Bovine Tuberculosis and the Vaccination of Wildlife  42	
 43	
In the United Kingdom, bTB is recognised as the most challenging animal disease 44	
problem [18] resulting in the slaughter of approximately 56,000 cattle per annum [19, 45	
20] at an annual cost to the taxpayer of £100 million [21]. Whilst cattle can transmit 46	
the disease between themselves, or translocate the disease by moving between 47	
farms, wildlife – notably badgers – are implicated in the spread of disease [22]. As a 48	
culturally iconic species [23], the culling of badgers to reduce the risk of transmission 49	
has resulted in public opposition but is supported by farming unions [24]. Since the 50	
1970s, successive governments have implemented policies of badger culling but a 51	
scientific trial of badger culling between 1998-2007 found limited benefits to disease 52	
	 3	
incidence [25]. The availability of a badger vaccine and evidence that it could reduce 53	
infection transmission [26, 27] led the Department for Environment, Food and Rural 54	
Affairs (Defra) to announce that badger vaccination would be delivered through the 55	
Badger Vaccine Deployment Project (BVDP) [28]i.  56	
  57	
Badger vaccination to reduce the risk of bTB transmission from wildlife meets the 58	
four pre-conditions for risk compensation suggested by Hedlund [1]. A perceived 59	
protective effect of vaccination may be balanced by purchasing replacement stock 60	
that carries the risk of translocating disease [29, 30]. There are no regulations to 61	
prevent this, and stock from areas of high disease incidence will be cheaper to 62	
purchase than those from herds with a history of disease freedom. A lack of trust 63	
between the government and farmers [31], debate over the ownership of disease 64	
management, and increasing incidence of bTB may contribute to risk compensation 65	
behaviours by encouraging low self-efficacy and fatalistic attitudes amongst farmers 66	
[32, 33]. Behavioural spillovers such as implementing additional biosecurity 67	
measures to limit contact between badgers and cattle may also be connected to 68	
vaccination. This may be for two reasons. Firstly, behavioural spillovers may be 69	
explained by cognitive dissonance theory [11] and self-perception theory [34] 70	
whereby similar behavioural routines are changed to minimise tension with the newly 71	
adopted behaviour and the identity they provide. The role of self-identity plays an 72	
important role in understanding farmer behaviour in which the cultural idea of ‘good 73	
farming’ [35] influences farmers’ decisions. Vaccination may therefore prompt 74	
farmers to take further biosecurity precautions to display the symbolic capital of ‘good 75	
farmers’ [36, 37]. As with risk compensation, however, these responses may be 76	
limited where farmers’ low self-efficacy leads them to conclude that there is nothing 77	
they can do to prevent disease [33, 38]. Secondly, culling can create a perturbation 78	
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effect in badger populations [39] that increases the risk of disease transmission 79	
prompting the need for additional biosecurity. Concerns about perturbation were 80	
raised by farmers in public meetings about vaccination attended by members of the 81	
research team. In response, Defra stated that observation of long-term research 82	
studies of badger populations meant that vaccination was ‘very unlikely’ to cause 83	
perturbation [28], This was subsequently confirmed by analysis which found no 84	
evidence of perturbation arising from badger vaccination [40].   85	
 86	
2.2 Data 87	
 88	
2.2.1  Study Areas 89	
 90	
Research was conducted between 2010-14 in five 100km2 areas: one with badger 91	
vaccination (the BVDP) [41] and four comparison areas with no vaccinationii. The 92	
BVDP was based in an area of Gloucestershire in which 50% of herds had previously 93	
experienced a bTB incident. These herds were compared with those in four similar-94	
sized non-vaccination areas. Three areas with long-standing endemic bTB in cattle 95	
were chosen: Great Torrington (Devon), Cheltenham and Tetbury (both 96	
Gloucestershire). The final area – Congleton (Cheshire) – was chosen because it 97	
had lower bTB incidence in cattle. 98	
 99	
2.2.2  Farmer Telephone Survey  100	
 101	
As no official longitudinal records of farmers’ biosecurity practices exist, self-reported 102	
biosecurity practices and attitudinal data were collected using two telephone surveys. 103	
The first survey ran between August-October in 2010 following the commencement 104	
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of the BVDP. The second was completed three months prior to its completion during 105	
October and November 2014. Respondents (farmers) were selected using a stratified 106	
sample of 1227 cattle herds across the five areas, drawn from the Animal and Plant 107	
Health Agency’s (APHA) bTB database.  108	
 109	
For each survey area, herds were organised by herd type and size, and every fourth 110	
herd listed was selected to be included in the survey. Reserve herds were selected 111	
using the same process which were used when a farmer refused to take part in the 112	
study (78 in total). Replacement cattle herds were similar to the herd they replaced in 113	
terms of farm type and farm size. Sampling was proportional to the number of farms 114	
in each area and farm type (beef and dairy) but included more dairy farms than 115	
proportionally necessary to enable comparisons between farm types and to allow for 116	
longitudinal attrition (see table 1).  117	
 118	
Self-reported data were collected for five biosecurity activities designed to reduce 119	
cattle-badger interactions. Attitudinal data on badger vaccination were collected by 120	
asking farmers to rate statements along a scale of 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly 121	
agree). Survey items addressed respondents’ overall feelings towards badger 122	
vaccination, known as their ‘general affective evaluation’ [42], and their perceptions 123	
of effectiveness and acceptability. Farmers were asked to assess their herd’s 124	
susceptibility to bTB, the extent to which they felt able to prevent bTB (‘self-efficacy’), 125	
and the role of social norms in disease prevention. Finally, farmers were asked who 126	
should pay for vaccination, and to score two dimensions of trust in government: 127	
competence and commitment [43].  128	
 129	
2.2.3 Observed Farmer Behaviour – Data on Cattle Movements 130	
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 131	
To account for risk compensation behaviour, data from the UK Government’s Cattle 132	
Tracing System (CTS) were used to identify the number of on-farm cattle movements 133	
prior to the survey period (2008-10) and during the final year of vaccination within the 134	
BVDP (2014). Data were extracted from CTS and matched to surveyed herds using 135	
each herd’s County, Parish, Holding, Herd (CPHH) unique identification code. 136	
 137	
2.2.4 Herd bTB History Data 138	
 139	
Data on each herd’s bTB history were extracted from the APHA’s bTB database and 140	
matched to surveyed farmers using their CPHH. Data included the number of cattle 141	
lost as a result of bTB (known as ‘reactors’); and the number of confirmed bTB 142	
incidentsiii between 2010-14. 143	
 144	
2.2.5 Qualitative Interviews 145	
 146	
Between the two surveys, three annual rounds of face-to-face interviews were carried 147	
out with a sub-sample of farmers selected from the baseline survey. In the first round, 148	
65 cattle farmers were interviewed during October and November 2011 in the 149	
vaccination area and two non-vaccination areas (Congleton and Great Torrington). 150	
Farmers were selected based on their willingness to participate in further research, 151	
and their levels of trust in the government and confidence in vaccination identified 152	
from responses to the telephone survey. Farmers selected for interview were 153	
distributed evenly across four categories representing different levels of confidence in 154	
badger vaccination [44] (see table 2). In the second round of interviews in November-155	
December 2012, 56 farmers were interviewed, and 50 in November-December 2013. 156	 --
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Interviews focused on farmers’ experience of bTB, their perceptions of the causes of 157	
bTB, its management and their confidence in badger vaccination.  158	
 159	
2. 3 Analysis 160	
 161	
Qualitative interviews were fully transcribed and analysed in Nvivo. Analysis sought 162	
to identify explanatory themes for farmers’ behavioural reactions to vaccination. 163	
Responses to the telephone survey were analysed in SPSS. Analysis of spillover 164	
behaviour focussed on the five self-reported biosecurity activities relating to badger-165	
cattle interactions. Longitudinal measures of biosecurity practices were calculated 166	
from farmers’ self-reports in each survey year. Analysis of risk compensation was 167	
assessed by examining cattle movement data for each herd.  168	
 169	
Quantitative analysis involved, firstly, a descriptive analysis of variables in each 170	
survey year and cross-tabulations between key statements and herd characteristics. 171	
Secondly, bivariate analysis tested for statistically significant differences between 172	
vaccination and non-vaccination areas, bTB status and herd characteristics and 173	
variables relating to risk compensation and spillover behaviour. Bivariate analysis 174	
used parametric (Pearson correlation, independent and paired samples t-test) and 175	
non-parametric (Chi-square, Mann-Whitney U and Wilcoxon) tests. Thirdly, 176	
multivariable analysis was conducted using a negative binomial log-linear regression. 177	
On-farm cattle movements during 2014 acted as the dependent variable. The 178	
selection of independent variables was informed by analysis of interview data relating 179	
to badger vaccination and disease control; and bivariate correlations to identify 180	
similar variables with the weakest relationship with the dependent variable 181	
eliminated. The final list of independent variables is shown in tables 3-5. Count 182	
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variables were log transformed in SPSS using natural logarithm, with 0.5 added to 183	
zero values prior to transformation. Longitudinal change values were calculated by 184	
subtracting 2010 values from 2014 values.  185	
 186	
2.4 Research Ethics 187	
 188	
Ethical approval was given by the social research ethics committees at the 189	
universities of Gloucestershire and Cardiff. Consent was gained from all research 190	
participants: they were provided with information on the project, reminded that their 191	
participation was voluntary, and that they could withdraw at any time. Farmers who 192	
completed both surveys were entered into a prize draw (£100, £50 and £25 shopping 193	
vouchers). Farmers participating in the annual interviews received a bottle of wine 194	
after the final interview. 195	
 196	
3.  Results 197	
 198	
3.1 Survey Response 199	
 200	
The response rate for the baseline survey was 80%, eliciting 338 usable responses 201	
and representing 27% of the total population of herds in the case study areas. The 202	
repeat survey in 2014 achieved 220 responses, a response rate of 65%, representing 203	
19% of the cattle farmer population in the study areas. Longitudinal attrition varied 204	
from 25% (North East of Cheltenham) to 45% (Tetbury. See table 1). Fifteen farmers 205	
dropped out of the longitudinal interviews. Attrition was evenly distributed between 206	
the three study areas. 207	
 208	
 209	
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3.2 Descriptive Analysis 210	
 211	
3.2.1 Herd Characteristics 212	
  213	
In 2010 the mean herd size was 160, and 167 in 2014 (see tables 6-7). Dairy herds 214	
were significantly larger (p<0.001), with 73% of dairy herds having over 100 cattle. 215	
Herd sizes in 2010 were highly correlated with those in 2014 (r=0.880, p<0.001). The 216	
proportion of herds under bTB restrictions at the time of the survey was similar in 217	
both years (16.9% compared to 20.0%). The vaccination area had the largest 218	
proportion of herds with bTB at the time of the 2014 survey (22.2%). 219	
 220	
3.2.2  On-Farm Cattle Movements  221	
 222	
Prior to the survey and deployment of badger vaccination, 85.5% of surveyed farms 223	
had on-farm cattle movements. During the survey / vaccination period, this fell to 224	
75.5%. Taking both periods together, 7.3% farms had no on-farm cattle movements. 225	
Amongst dairy herds, 94.5% had on-farm cattle movements, and 86.1% of herds that 226	
experienced a bTB incident had on-farm cattle movements.  Prior to the start of the 227	
BVDP in 2010, 69.1% of herds in the vaccination area had on-farm movements 228	
compared to 90.9% of farms in non-vaccination areas (p<0.001). Herds that had 229	
experienced a bTB incident during the survey period were more likely to have on-230	
farm cattle movements in 2014 (p<0.001).  231	
 232	
3.2.3 Biosecurity Activities 233	
 234	
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Farmers’ self-reported biosecurity activities were low in both survey years (see tables 235	
8-9). The most common activity was badger-proofing feed stores in 2010 (69.1%) 236	
and 2014 (57.1%). Implementation of new activities during the survey period was 237	
also low: between 12% (fencing setts and latrines) to 17% (raising feed and water 238	
troughs) of farmers reported adopting a new biosecurity activity between 2010-14. 239	
Farmers in the vaccination area were more likely to fence off badger latrines in 2010 240	
(p=0.011) and 2014 (p=0.004) and fence off badger setts (2010, p=0.016; 2014, 241	
p=0.002).  Similarly, farmers in the vaccination area were also more likely to start 242	
fencing off badger latrines (p=0.001) and setts (p=0.001) between 2010-14. 243	
 244	
3.2.4 Attitudes to Badger Vaccination  245	
 246	
Farmers’ attitudes to vaccination were generally negative in 2010 and became more 247	
negative in 2014 (table 9). By 2014, fewer farmers thought vaccination was 248	
acceptable (p<0.001), was a good thing to do (p=0.003), or gave them confidence 249	
about avoiding bTB (p=0.002). Farmers’ general affective evaluation of vaccination 250	
was higher in the vaccination area in 2010 and 2014 (p<0.001). However, these 251	
farmers also became more negative over time: fewer thought vaccination was 252	
acceptable (p=0.032), had confidence in vaccination (p=0.023), or believed it would 253	
reduce their chances of getting bTB (p<0.001) in 2014 than in 2010. Farmers with 254	
herds that had suffered a bTB incident between 2010-14 were more likely to believe 255	
that the government should pay for badger vaccination (p=0.008) and that their herds 256	
were susceptible to bTB (p<0.001 both survey years).  257	
 258	
3.3 Generalised Linear Model 259	
 260	
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Thirteen variables were statistically significant (p<0.05) (see table 10). The model 261	
shows evidence of risk compensation amongst surveyed farmers: those in the 262	
vaccination area had more on-farm cattle movements (p=0.021) even when adjusting 263	
for a large number of other independent variables. Dairy herds had more on-farm 264	
cattle movements (p<0.001) as were larger herds (p<0.001 both years). Herds with 265	
bTB reactors in 2014 were not associated with more on-farm movements, but they 266	
were in 2010 (p<0.001). Prior cattle movement practices (in 2008-10) were also 267	
related to those in 2014 (p=0.007). 268	
 269	
Farms that had always fenced off badger setts had the lowest number of on-farm 270	
cattle movements. However, only in non-vaccination areas was the relationship 271	
between new biosecurity activities and lower cattle movements significant (p=0.035). 272	
 273	
Four of the nine longitudinal attitudinal variables were significantly related to cattle 274	
movements. Farmers with lower cattle movements were more likely to have a 275	
positive general affective evaluation of vaccination (p=0.001) and increasing levels of 276	
self-efficacy (p=0.006). Farmers who believed they had become more susceptible to 277	
bTB moved on fewer cattle (p=0.041), as did those who increasingly thought that the 278	
government should pay for vaccination (p<0.001). On-farm cattle movements were 279	
not connected to trust in government or social norms. 280	
 281	
In the non-vaccination areas, farmers who believed that the government should pay 282	
for vaccination had higher on-farm cattle movements (p=0.005). In the vaccination 283	
area, farmers moved on fewer cattle if they believed badgers posed a risk to their 284	
bTB status (p=0.004). 285	
 286	
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3.4  Qualitative Interviews with Farmers 287	
 288	
Analysis of qualitative interviews revealed that vaccination failed to fit with farmers’ 289	
cultural understandings of disease. This stemmed, firstly, from farmers’ beliefs that 290	
the spread of bTB was due to a rise in the badger population. Farmers therefore 291	
believed the most effective disease control measures would be to reduce the badger 292	
population. These arguments were connected to farmers’ broader cultural 293	
understandings of nature that emphasised the need for a “natural balance”. In 294	
distinguishing between ‘healthy’ and ‘diseased’ badgers, farmers argued that healthy 295	
badgers needed to be protected to ward off diseased badgers, whilst those that were 296	
diseased needed to be euthanised.  297	
 298	
Secondly, badger vaccination proved unpopular because it lacked ‘practice similarity’ 299	
– in that its practicalities were dissimilar to other vaccination practices that farmers 300	
employed. Explaining their opposition to badger vaccination, farmers consistently 301	
drew on their own experiences of vaccinating cattle against other diseases. Farmers 302	
argued that vaccinating badgers that were already infected was pointless, and just 303	
like their own approach to herd-health, badgers would need to be tested to see which 304	
ones were infected (and culled) whilst the remainder were vaccinated. Equally, 305	
farmers’ experiences of vaccinating all cattle against diseases other than bTB, meant 306	
that in their view, badger vaccination would work only if 100% of badgers were 307	
vaccinated. Farmers thought this was impractical at the scale at which the vaccine 308	
needed to be administered.  309	
 310	
Practicality was also a key reason in dismissing potential spillover behaviours such 311	
as biosecurity. Farmers suggested these would involve significant cost or disruptive 312	
	 13	
changes to farm management. The challenges of effectively separating cattle from 313	
badgers at pasture was frequently cited as one reason for not implementing 314	
biosecurity, which was matched by widespread concern that farmers were unable to 315	
control bTB and that it was simply a matter of bad luck. These fatalistic attitudes 316	
towards biosecurity were reinforced by a belief – particularly amongst dairy farmers – 317	
that these activities did not benefit their own social or economic status.  318	
 319	
In the vaccination area, the visibility of vaccination itself was also limited. Farmers’ 320	
contact with the team delivering vaccination varied markedly. Some farmers knew the 321	
number of badgers that had been vaccinated but others raised concerns about the 322	
level of communication they had received from scientists running the project. Some 323	
farmers claimed they had “no idea” when the last or next time badgers would be 324	
vaccinated on their farm. Those that had a bTB outbreak during the BVDP 325	
questioned whether vaccination had contributed to the incident. In short, the lack of 326	
visibility of the very intervention that could prompt spillover behaviours is likely to 327	
have negatively impacted upon farmers’ perceptions of the need for other 328	
complementary biosecurity behaviours. 329	
 330	
The politics of badger vaccination and disease control were also of significance to 331	
farmers. Interviews revealed a lack of trust in the government to deal effectively with 332	
bTB. Farmers suggested the ownership of the problem lay with the government and 333	
policy initiatives for encourage farmers to ‘take ownership’ of bTB [45] were viewed 334	
suspiciously. It was common for farmers to suggest that ideas of responsibility had 335	
been pushed onto the agricultural industry because of government failings. Farmers 336	
therefore perceived the government to be handing over their ‘dirty work’. The 337	
--
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government’s failure to implement a badger cull policy in 2011 also contributed to the 338	
belief that they could not be trusted to manage bTB effectively. 339	
 340	
4.  Discussion  341	
 342	
The strongest predictors of cattle movements were herd-level characteristics, such 343	
as herd size and type, prior disease incidence and management methods. Whilst the 344	
analysis shows these to be related to on-farm cattle movements, they are also well 345	
established risk factors for bTB [32]. The analysis therefore suggests the presence of 346	
a cycle of infection: movements in 2008-10 are related to disease incidence in 347	
subsequent years, which are further related to subsequent cattle movements. As 348	
highlighted by the qualitative research, these herd management practices can be 349	
difficult to change, reflecting what Sutherland, Burton [46] refer to as ‘path-350	
dependent’ behaviours. Path-dependency may depend on social, economic and 351	
environmental factors, but disrupting these embedded behaviours requires specific 352	
triggers to prompt change. Potential triggers include disease outbreaks, and 353	
potentially government interventions and/or significant policy changes. In this case, 354	
however, disease incidence seems to be an insufficient disruption to existing deeply 355	
embedded farming practices. This may lead not only to an embedded cycle of 356	
disease, but also reinforces existing behaviours and may explain the limited adoption 357	
of biosecurity activities.  358	
 359	
This explanation also applies to the relative lack of spillover activities. There is only 360	
limited evidence of spillover in the vaccination area and adoption was only 361	
significantly higher in the vaccination area for two of the five biosecurity activities. For 362	
those farmers that did report new biosecurity activities, the outstanding question is 363	
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why? It could be these increases represent a form of social desirability bias [47] in 364	
which farmers have become more aware of the conduct expected of them by 365	
government. There is little evidence though that implementing new biosecurity 366	
activities is related to ‘good farming’ cultural identities [35]. Being seen to be a ‘good 367	
farmer’ and practice ‘good farming’ can be relevant in the adoption of some 368	
biosecurity management practices [36, 37]. Likewise, studies of spillover suggest that 369	
the visibility of new behaviours can help to reinforce and publicly affirm positive 370	
subjectivities such as the ‘responsible citizen’ [48]. In this case however, the low-level 371	
adoption of biosecurity may instead reflect the activities of ‘niche’ identities that are 372	
yet to become mainstream [46]. Helping these cultural identities to become 373	
established is a challenge facing policy makers. New methods to make the benefits 374	
of biosecurity publicly visible and disrupt existing social norms amongst farmers 375	
could help. This could include, for example, the mandatory use of bTB herd risk 376	
ratings to regulate cattle purchasing [38]. As well as potentially contributing to 377	
spillover, these methods could also limit risk compensation behaviour in wildlife 378	
control areas. 379	
 380	
Further research is therefore required to establish the reasons why a minority of 381	
farmers adopt new biosecurity measures, and the extent to which they count as 382	
spillover from badger vaccination or other initiatives. In general, however, the failure 383	
to implement new forms of biosecurity is more readily explained by the attitudes held 384	
by farmers displayed in both the surveys and the qualitative research. The 385	
consistency of these attitudes, showing little change between 2010-14, suggests that 386	
triggers like disease outbreaks or new disease control policies (such as vaccination) 387	
have little impact upon existing attitudes or behaviours.  388	
 389	
-- --
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In terms of risk compensation, the analysis finds conflicting evidence. On the one 390	
hand, the evidence suggests an association between risk compensation behaviours 391	
and badger vaccination. Separate analysis of farms in the vaccination area shows 392	
reduced on-farm cattle movements for farmers who increasingly thought vaccination 393	
was a good thing to do, that bTB was not down to luck, and with perceptions of 394	
increasing bTB risk. Potentially, changes in these attitudes may reflect a form of 395	
educational spillover from vaccination that modifies farmer behaviour. In general, 396	
however, attitudes towards vaccination were negative and the government was 397	
distrusted to manage bTB. Moreover, whilst farmers were aware they were in a 398	
vaccination area, frequently they were unaware of whether their badgers had been 399	
vaccinated and felt distanced from the practice of vaccination. Further research is 400	
therefore required to unpack how interventions such as vaccination encourage new 401	
behaviours and farming practices. For example, to what extent do factors specific to 402	
the vaccination area, not accounted for in the model, explain farmers’ behaviour? 403	
One possibility might be the role of social networks and the significance of influential 404	
advisers such as local veterinarians. 405	
 406	
Of particular importance to policy makers is the relationship between cattle 407	
movement practices and self-efficacy, and attitudes to the ownership of disease 408	
management. Firstly, low levels of self-efficacy – such as the fatalistic views of bTB 409	
transmission and the role of luck – replicate earlier qualitative research on farmers’ 410	
understandings of bTB [33]. Results presented here show for the first time how these 411	
low levels of self-efficacy can impact upon the transmission of bTB by being 412	
significantly related to on-farm cattle movements. This shows the importance to 413	
policy makers of taking farmers’ self-efficacy seriously when managing disease: 414	
when farmers lose faith in disease management and their ability to do anything about 415	
--
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disease, their actions may increase disease risks. This may explain the apparent 416	
conflict between risk compensation and farmers’ sceptical attitudes towards 417	
vaccination effectiveness. Rather than beliefs in vaccination effectiveness driving risk 418	
compensation, as Hedlund’s conditions would suggest, higher levels of on-farm cattle 419	
movements in vaccination areas may be attributable to farmers’ perceived lack of 420	
alternative options or their belief that any risk reduction measures they take will be 421	
ineffective.  422	
 423	
Secondly, both qualitative and quantitative data revealed how farmers believed that it 424	
was the government’s responsibility to deal with bTB, and where they did they were 425	
more likely to engage in risky behaviour and eschew risk reduction measures. This is 426	
significant for two reasons. Firstly, the governance of disease and its ‘ownership’ by 427	
the farming industry has been cited as a key factor in successful disease eradication 428	
programmes [49, 50]. These results suggest that attempts to encourage a greater 429	
sense of ownership of bTB amongst English farmers is required if they are not to 430	
undermine the efforts of disease management policy. This could include allowing 431	
farmers greater say in the governance of disease and/or the use of financial levies to 432	
both fund disease control and help develop a collective sense of responsibility [38]. 433	
These findings also suggest that perceptions of ‘ownership’ need to be added to 434	
Hedlund’s preconditions of risk compensation. In this sense, it is not enough to 435	
simply have confidence a disease control intervention such as vaccination to reduce 436	
the perception of risk. Rather, interventions need to be delivered by and paid for by 437	
the people or agencies perceived to be the most appropriate: those that are not are 438	
unlikely to succeed. It is not clear, however, whether ownership is more or less 439	
relevant to all interventions, or whether those that fit cultural understandings of 440	
disease management (in this case, badger culling) means it is less significant. 441	
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Further research is therefore required to assess the extent of risk compensation and 442	
its underlying reasons for other wildlife control measures.  443	
 444	
These findings also confirm wider concerns in the spillover literature. Analysis 445	
confirms that farmers appear to be consistent in their risk-taking: either adopting 446	
biosecurity and reducing cattle movements, or vice-versa. Given concerns about the 447	
ownership of disease, this may not be surprising: there was no cost of vaccination to 448	
farmers and as such they are likely to have placed little value on them. Moreover, 449	
previous studies suggest that spillover occurs when new practices are functionally 450	
and culturally similar to those that are already used [11]. This research confirms this 451	
in two ways. Spillover behaviours depend on the similarity between related but 452	
different practices – referred to as ‘practice similarity’. In this case, badger 453	
vaccination was not perceived to be similar to farmers’ existing herd health 454	
management practices. Badger vaccination was also inconsistent with farmers’ 455	
cultural beliefs on disease transmission and the management of wildlife. Other social 456	
research of veterinary vaccines finds similar results. For example, Heffernan, 457	
Thomson [51] shows how the use of vaccines for Foot and Mouth Disease in Bolivia 458	
did not relate to factors such as efficacy, but to a match between cultural beliefs of 459	
disease aetiology and lay beliefs about how vaccines work.  460	
 461	
The study has a number of limitations that should be addressed by further research. 462	
Firstly, there was only one vaccination area and it was not large. External validity 463	
would be improved with comparative data from vaccination areas in other parts of 464	
England and Wales with different farming characteristics and bTB infection risk. 465	
Secondly, using the number of on-farm cattle movements as an example of risk 466	
compensation does not take into account their degree of risk. Taking into account the 467	
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disease histories of purchased cattle in further analysis would help to inform policy 468	
decisions over the need to introduce risk-based trading schemes to limit cattle 469	
movements [21]. The contextual nature of farming decisions highlights the 470	
importance of on-going detailed social research. In particular, research targeted at 471	
understanding the decision making process in cattle purchasing decisions [52] would 472	
provide a greater level of understanding to risk compensation behaviour. Finally, risk 473	
compensation (or spillover) following vaccination may be encountered in different 474	
disease contexts (exotic and endemic diseases) and for different animals (farmed 475	
and companion). Further research in all these different contexts can help provide a 476	
broader understanding of how and why behavioural adaptions to animal health 477	
interventions occur. 478	
 479	
5.  Conclusion 480	
 481	
Integral to an understanding of how animal disease control interventions work is an 482	
appreciation of what behavioural changes they provoke. This paper has investigated 483	
for the first time whether risk compensation and/or spillover behaviours are 484	
associated with the vaccination of wildlife to control the spread of animal disease. 485	
Evidence of these behavioural reactions is important for policy makers in order to 486	
effectively plan disease control interventions. In focusing on the behavioural impacts 487	
amongst farmers of badger vaccination, this paper finds limited evidence of spillover 488	
behaviour whilst apparent risk compensation behaviour may be better explained as a 489	
reaction to low self-efficacy and a poor match between vaccination and farmers’ 490	
cultural understandings of disease management. Crucially, perceptions of ownership 491	
of disease management appear to be linked to farmers’ disease management 492	
practices that may also contribute to a reinforcement of existing behaviours. The 493	
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results provide important lessons for policy makers seeking to manage the spread of 494	
animal disease. Given their importance, further research should be directed to 495	
analyses of risk compensation and spillover behaviours in relation to other disease 496	
control measures and uses of vaccination for other animal diseases. 497	
 498	
 499	
 500	 																																																								
Notes		i	Following a change in government policy in 2013, badger culls funded by farmers 
have been approved. By 2019, there were 43 farmer-led badger culls across England 
(see: https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/bovine-tb-controlling-the-risk-of-
bovine-tb-from-badgers#licences-and-authorisations)  
ii The BVDP was based only in Stroud. Plans for other vaccination areas were scaled 
back following a change in government in 2010. Voluntary vaccination projects are 
funded by government grants, but these were not considered for this study.	iii	Classified as evidence of lesions or culture of M. bovis at post-mortem.	
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Table 1: Characteristics of surveyed farms in comparison to the total population of farms. 
	
	 Total	Herds	Surveyed	/		
Total	Population	
Herd	Characteristics	
Dairy	 Beef	 Mixed	 Dairy	 Beef	 Mixed	
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Vaccination	Area	
Stroud	 79	 55	 258	 30.62	 250	 22.00	 20	 67	 29.85	 22	 158	 13.92	 12	 33	 36.36	 23	 66	 34.85	 25	 180	 13.89	 6	 4	 150.00*	
Non-Vaccination	Areas	
Cheltenham	 48	 36	 114	 42.11	 105	 34.29	 5	 10	 33.33	 13	 92	 14.13	 18	 12	 150.00*	 6	 11	 54.55	 28	 86	 32.56	 2	 92	 2.17	
Tetbury	 61	 33	 148	 41.21	 135	 24.44	 9	 34	 25.71	 15	 95	 15.79	 9	 19	 47.37	 8	 28	 28.57	 19	 101	 18.81	 1	 6	 16.67	
Congelton	 75	 47	 426	 17.61	 420	 11.19	 20	 148	 13.42	 19	 227	 8.37	 8	 51	 15.69	 23	 140	 16.43	 19	 273	 6.96	 5	 7	 71.43	
Great	
Torrington	 75	 49	 281	 26.69	 249	 19.68	 13	 66	 19.70	 14	 189	 7.41	 22	 26	 84.62	 13	 68	 19.12	 36	 177	 20.34	 0	 4	 0.00	
Total	 338	 220	 1227	 27.54	 1157	 19.01	 67	 325	 20.62	 83	 761	 10.91	 69	 141	 48.94	 73	 313	 23.32	 127	 823	 15.43	 14	 21	 66.67	
 3	
Notes: 4	
* reflects differences in herd type classification between official and farmer self-reports 5	
 6	
		 2	
 7	
Table 2: Interviewees by type of and category of vaccination confidence. 
	
	 Vaccination	Area	 Non-Vaccination	Areas	 Total	
Congleton	 Great	Torrington	
	 2011	 2012	 2013	 2011	 2012	 2013	 2011	 2012	 2013	 2011	 2012	 2013	
Acceptance	 9	 9	 9	 6	 5	 5	 4	 3	 2	 19	 17	 16	
Distrust	 4	 2	 2	 3	 3	 2	 7	 6	 6	 14	 11	 10	
Critical	Acceptance	 3	 3	 3	 5	 4	 3	 5	 4	 4	 13	 11	 10	
Critical	Trust	 4	 4	 3	 8	 6	 6	 7	 7	 5	 19	 17	 14	
Total	 20	 18	 17	 22	 18	 16	 23	 20	 17	 65	 56	 50	
 8	
  9	
		 3	
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Table	3:	Herd	Characteristic	variables	used	in	the	Generalised	Linear	Model	
	
	
Concept	 Dimension	 Variable	Name	 Variable	Type	 Data	Type	 Source	
Herd	Management	
Characteristics	
Movements	2010-2014	 2014Movements	 Dependent	 Count	
CTS	Movements	2008-2010	 movementslog200810	 Independent	 Count,	log	transformed	using	
natural	logarithm	
Herd	Characteristics	 Herd	Size	2010	 herdsizelog2010	 Independent	
Count,	log	transformed	using	
natural	logarithm	
APHA	bTB	Dataset	
Herd	Size	2014	 herdsizelog2014	 Independent	
Herd	Disease	
Characteristics	
Number	of	bTB	Reactors	2008-2010	 reactors2010log	 Independent	
Number	of	bTB	Reactors	2010-2014	 reactors2014log	 Independent	
Vaccination	 In	the	BVDP	area	 In	bvdp	(2010)	 Independent	 Dummy	variable	
(vaccination/not	vaccination)	
Herd	Type	 Dairy	herd	 Dairy	Herd	in	2014	 Independent	 Dummy	variable	(dairy/not	
dairy)	
APHA	bTB	Dataset	/	
Survey		11	 	12	 	13	 	14	 	15	 	 	16	
		 4	
Table	4:	Survey	Variables	used	in	the	Generalised	Linear	Model	
	
Concept	 Dimension	 Survey	Question	 Variable	Type	 Data	Type	
Longitudinal	attitudes	to	
Vaccination	2010-2014		
Vaccine	Acceptability	 Badger	vaccination	is	an	acceptable	way	of	dealing	with	bTB	
Independent	
1-5	Scale	(Strongly	Disagree	–	Strongly	Agree)	
	
Calculated	scale	(2014	minus	2010	value):	-4	(more	
negative)	to	+4	(more	positive)	
Vaccine	General	
Affective	Evaluation	
think	vaccinating	badgers	is	a	good	thing	
to	do	
Independent	
Vaccine	Effectiveness	
	
Badger	vaccination	will	help	me	feel	more	
confident	about	avoiding	TB	restrictions	
Independent	
Vaccine	Responsibility	
	
Paying	for	badger	vaccination	should	be	
the	Government's	responsibility	
Independent	
Vaccine	Self-Efficacy	
	
It’s	a	matter	of	luck	if	my	herd	goes	down	
with	bTB*	
Independent	
Vaccine	Social	Norms	 My	chances	of	getting	TB	are	lower	if	I	follow	what	other	farmers	in	the	area	do	
Independent	
Disease	Susceptibility	 My	herd	is	susceptible	because	of	badgers	on	or	near	my	farm	
Independent	
Trust	in	Government:	
Commitment	
The	Government	is	committed	to	
reducing	bTB	
Independent	
Trust	in	Government:	
Competency	
The	Government	is	doing	a	good	job	in	
relation	to	bTB	
Independent	
Longitudinal	Biosecurity	
Spillover	Activities	 Fence	off	Badger	Setts	
Which	of	the	following	activities	have	you	
undertaken	on	your	farm:	Fencing	off	
Badger	Setts	
Independent	
Yes/no	
	
Longitudinal	categories	calculated	from	2010	and	2014	
responses:	Never;	Adopted	by	2014;	Always	had;	
Stopped	by	2014**	
	
Notes:	
*	Reversed	scale	
**	Converted	to	dummy	variables	for	analysis	in	GLM	
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Table	5:	Descriptive	statistics	of	variables	used	in	the	Generalised	Linear	Model	
	
Variable	 N	 Minimum	 Maximum	 Mean	 Std.	Deviation	 Percent	
No.	On-farm	Cattle	Movements	2014	 198	 0.00	 6064.00	 301.32	 662.80	 -	
Herd	Size	2010	(Log)	1	 198	 -0.69	 7.31	 4.11	 1.80	 -	
Herd	Size	2014	(Log)	1	 198	 -0.69	 7.38	 4.11	 1.88	 -	
On-farm	cattle	movements	2008-10	(Log)	1	 198	 -0.69	 8.96	 3.88	 2.32	 -	
No.	Reactors	2010	(Log)	1	 198	 -0.69	 5.72	 1.12	 1.86	 -	
No.	Reactors	2014	(Log)	1	 198	 -0.69	 4.32	 0.28	 1.34	 -	
In	vaccination	area	 198	 0.00	 1.00	 0.26	 0.44	 -	
Dairy	Herd	 198	 0.00	 1.00	 0.33	 0.47	 -	
Vaccine	Acceptability	 198	 -3.00	 3.00	 -0.37	 1.28	 -	
Vaccine	General	Affective	Evaluation	 198	 -4.00	 3.00	 -0.26	 1.26	 -	
Vaccine	Effectiveness	 198	 -4.00	 3.00	 -0.36	 1.29	 -	
Vaccine	Responsibility	 198	 -4.00	 3.00	 0.09	 0.98	 -	
Vaccine	Self-Efficacy	 198	 -4.00	 4.00	 0.16	 1.29	 -	
Vaccine	Social	Norms	 198	 -3.00	 3.00	 0.02	 1.20	 -	
Disease	Susceptibility	 198	 -4.00	 3.00	 0.08	 1.16	 -	
Trust	in	Government:	Commitment	 198	 -3.00	 3.00	 -0.01	 1.28	 -	
Trust	in	Government:	Competency	 198	 -3.00	 3.00	 -0.30	 1.37	 -	
Never	fenced	badger	setts	 135.00	 0	 1	 -	 -	 68.20%	
Fenced	badger	setts	in	2014	 26.00	 0	 1	 -	 -	 13.10%	
Always	have	fenced	badger	setts	 17.00	 0	 1	 -	 -	 8.60%	
Stopped	fencing	badger	setts	by	2014	 20.00	 0	 1	 -	 -	 10.10%	
Notes 
1	Natural	log	transformation	applied	to	variables 
	
 19	
 20	
 21	
  22	
		 6	
 23	
Table 6: Characteristics of all herds in the research areas 
 
	 	 No	
Herds	
(n)	
Under	bTB	Restrictions	at	
time	of	2010	survey	
Confirmed	bTB	
incidents	
(mean)	
Days	under	bTB	
restriction	
(mean)	
Number	of	
Reactors	
(mean)	
Movements	
2008-10	
(mean)	
Herd	Size	
	
(mean)	
	 	 	 n	 %	 	 	 	 	 	
Vaccination	Area	
Stroud	 Dairy	 67	 12	 17.91	 2.57	 827.93	 34.94	 295.59	 214.69	
Beef	 158	 12	 7.59	 2.32	 330.45	 8.6	 355.7	 83.49	
Mixed	 33	 3	 9.09	 1.67	 215.73	 3.33	 307.27	 51.32	
Total	 258	 27	 10.47	 2.35	 444.97	 14.77	 333.75	 116.35	
Non-Vaccination	Area	
Cheltenham	 Dairy	 10	 4	 40.00	 2.78	 1232.0	 97.60	 329.22	 238.6	
Beef	 92	 16	 17.39	 2.52	 534.55	 17.78	 155.07	 88.3	
Mixed	 12	 0	 0.00	 1.67	 125.58	 2.0	 63.25	 46.17	
Total	 114	 20	 17.54	 2.52	 552.68	 23.12	 163.48	 100.32	
Tetbury	 Dairy	 34	 5	 14.71	 2.37	 760.0	 27.65	 474.69	 305.7	
Beef	 95	 12	 12.63	 1.80	 202.66	 4.62	 145.34	 68.75	
Mixed	 19	 3	 15.79	 1.88	 156.58	 3.95	 317.87	 71.94	
Total	 148	 20	 13.51	 2.01	 324.78	 9.82	 241.86	 123.45	
Congleton	 Dairy	 148	 14	 9.46	 1.89	 267.22	 17.76	 271.89	 164.35	
Beef	 227	 7	 3.08	 1.24	 66.11	 1.49	 97.03	 40.23	
Mixed	 51	 1	 1.96	 1.38	 54.9	 1.53	 132.16	 55.65	
Total	 426	 22	 5.16	 1.63	 134.64	 7.15	 164.81	 87.34	
Great	Torrington	 Dairy	 66	 16	 24.24	 2.20	 1047.5	 41.77	 395.7	 330.52	
Beef	 189	 15	 7.94	 1.86	 309.25	 6.28	 163.66	 83.19	
Mixed	 26	 1	 3.85	 1.25	 211.58	 3.46	 166.72	 72.72	
Total	 281	 32	 11.39	 1.96	 473.61	 14.36	 222.18	 141.81	
Total	
Dairy	 325	 51	 15.69	 2.24	 622.51	 29.67	 324.37	 225.3	
Beef	 761	 62	 8.15	 2.01	 255.06	 6.52	 181.78	 69.38	
Mixed	 141	 8	 5.67	 1.57	 141.15	 2.67	 200.06	 60.52	
Total	 1227	 121	 9.86	 2.07	 339.3	 12.21	 223.47	 111.76	
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Table 7: Characteristics of surveyed herds 
	
	 	 Herd	Size	
	(mean)	
Confirmed	bTB	
Incidents	(mean)	
Cattle	Movements	
(mean)	
Days	under	bTB	
restriction	(mean)	
Number	of	bTB	
Reactors	(mean)	
Herds	under	bTB	
restriction	(%)	
	 	 2010	 2014	 2010	 2014	 2008-10	 2014	 2010	 2014	 2010	 2014	 2010	 2014	
Vaccination	Area	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Stroud	 Dairy	 260.5	 247.61	 2.32	 1.09	 290.55	 908.52	 939.2	 156.87	 35.84	 4.83	 40.0	 26.09	
Beef	 161.32	 151.36	 1.33	 0.44	 457.59	 107.32	 380.1	 99.48	 6.57	 3.08	 27.27	 20.0	
Mixed	 61.92	 91.67	 0.33	 -	 33.0	 20.17	 101.33	 29.67	 3.17	 -	 -	 16.67	
All	 175.96	 185.72	 1.46	 0.67	 301.37	 438.89	 527.96	 116.17	 16.48	 3.48	 25.93	 22.22	
Non-Vaccination	Areas	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Cheltenham	 Dairy	 147.8	 153.33	 2.80	 0.50	 237.0	 252.67	 1406.6	 217.17	 152.4	 1.33	 20.0	 66.67	
Beef	 211.0	 131.75	 1.54	 0.93	 604.23	 132.14	 499.00	 118.96	 20.31	 4.64	 15.38	 10.71	
Mixed	 94.89	 15.5	 2.06	 1.00	 145.22	 40.0	 555.18	 123.5	 19.17	 4.0	 22.22	 -	
All	 144.17	 128.89	 1.97	 0.86	 323.72	 147.11	 655.94	 135.58	 38.08	 4.06	 19.44	 19.44	
Tetbury	 Dairy	 373.33	 453.75	 2.11	 1.13	 434.22	 1442.13	 848.56	 250.63	 17.11	 15.63	 22.22	 50.0	
Beef	 56.40	 58.0	 1.14	 0.58	 109.33	 91.47	 171.14	 90.84	 4.86	 2.74	 -	 5.26	
Mixed	 49.78	 150.0	 0.89	 -	 71.78	 25.0	 203.22	 -	 3.89	 -	 11.11	 -	
All	 141.03	 174.36	 1.34	 0.71	 187.7	 475.0	 370.69	 133.25	 8.03	 6.32	 9.09	 17.86	
Congelton	 Dairy	 260.0	 212.48	 1.37	 0.57	 318.25	 417.43	 307.8	 63.22	 14.0	 4.04	 10.0	 9.09	
Beef	 72.63	 73.11	 0.47	 0.32	 112.79	 38.89	 119.63	 44.0	 3.16	 3.11	 10.53	 5.26	
Mixed	 30.71	 147.2	 0.25	 0.40	 84.5	 366.4	 60.38	 5.4	 0.88	 4.20	 -	 20.0	
All	 145.22	 149.19	 0.80	 0.45	 195.4	 258.98	 189.62	 49.3	 7.24	 3.68	 8.51	 8.7	
Great	
Torrington	
Dairy	 316.0	 351.15	 2.67	 1.15	 399.23	 874.46	 1334.08	 219.62	 57.5	 7.77	 53.85	 15.38	
Beef	 180.43	 132.28	 0.86	 0.33	 329.71	 72.94	 394.79	 144.22	 7.43	 1.31	 35.71	 13.89	
Mixed	 111.73	 -	 0.73	 -	 114.73	 -	 283.05	 -	 4.45	 -	 18.18	 -	
All	 185.55	 190.35	 1.25	 0.55	 251.63	 285.59	 578.4	 164.22	 18.58	 3.02	 32.65	 14.29	
Total	 Dairy	 278.14	 269.82	 2.11	 0.89	 335.21	 752.3	 842.71	 153.77	 39.89	 6.0	 29.85	 25.0	
Beef	 133.06	 115.95	 1.05	 0.52	 317.12	 90.44	 304.51	 106.87	 7.83	 2.87	 18.07	 11.81	
Mixed	 81.94	 104.79	 0.97	 0.29	 99.36	 147.0	 282.25	 32.29	 7.58	 2.07	 13.04	 14.29	
All	 161.17	 167.71	 1.34	 0.63	 254.05	 319.92	 462.68	 117.99	 17.34	 3.89	 20.09	 16.43	
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Table	8:	Longitudinal	Changes	to	Biosecurity	Activities	
	
	 	 Never	had	 Adopted	in	2014	
but	not	2010	
Always	had	 Used	in	2010	but	
not	in	2014	
x2	
Non-vaccination	Area	 Fence	Latrines		 86.6%	 10.4%	 1.2%	 1.8%	 0.001	
Fence	Setts		 76.8%	 8.5%	 7.3%	 7.3%	 0.001	
Secure	Buildings		 46.6%	 14.1%	 28.8%	 10.4%	 0.791	
Badger	proofing		 12.9%	 15.3%	 42.3%	 29.4%	 0.100	
Raising	Troughs		 23.2%	 18.3%	 31.7%	 26.8%	 0.126	
Vaccination	Area	 Fence	Latrines		 66.7%	 16.7%	 13.0%	 3.7%	 0.001	
Fence	Setts		 48.1%	 22.2%	 13.0%	 16.7%	 0.001	
Secure	Buildings		 48.1%	 18.5%	 25.9%	 7.4%	 0.819	
Badger	proofing		 25.9%	 13.0%	 42.6%	 18.5%	 0.107	
Raising	Troughs		 25.9%	 13.0%	 46.3%	 14.8%	 0.124	
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Table	9:	Descriptive	Statistics	and	Bivariate	analysis	of	vaccine	attitudes	and	biosecurity	activities	
	
	 Survey	 All	Herds	 Dairy	Herds	 Vaccination	
Area	
TB	Free	
Herds	
Herds	with	on-
movements	(2014)	
	 Year	 Mean	/	%	 Mean	/	%	 Mean	/	%	 Mean	/	%	 Mean	/	%	
Badger	vaccination	is	an	acceptable	way	of	dealing	with	bTB	 2010	 2.93	 2.81	 3.07	 3.02	 2.91	
2014	 2.56***	 2.36	 2.67	 2.70	 2.56	
Paying	for	badger	vaccination	should	be	the	Government's	
responsibility	
2010	 4.17	 4.33++	 4.31	 4.15	 4.15	
2014	 4.26	 4.25	 4.29	 4.10+++	 4.28	
I	think	vaccinating	badgers	is	a	good	thing	to	do	 2010	 3.13	 3.13	 3.53+++	 3.19	 3.13	
2014	 2.87***	 2.95	 3.24+++	 2.94	 2.90	
Badger	vaccination	will	help	me	feel	more	confident	about	avoiding	
TB	restrictions	
2010	 2.95	 2.85	 3.04	 3.03	 2.98	
2014	 2.61**	 2.47	 2.60	 2.69	 2.60	
Badger	vaccination	will	reduce	the	chances	of	my	herd	going	under	
bTB	restrictions	
2010	 3.19	 3.16	 3.35	 3.19	 3.19	
2014	 2.91***	 2.90	 2.69	 2.89	 2.86	
The	Government	is	doing	a	good	job	in	relation	to	bTB	 2010	 2.53	 2.39	 2.11---	 2.73+++	 2.48	
2014	 2.24***	 2.21	 2.45	 2.30	 2.25	
The	Government	takes	its	commitments	to	reducing	bTB	seriously	 2010	 3.19	 3.05	 2.95-	 3.30	 3.14	
2014	 3.23	 3.18	 3.20	 3.27	 3.21	
The	Government	cares	about	reducing	bTB	 2010	 3.72	 3.61	 3.52	 3.75	 3.68	
2014	 2.74***	 2.67	 2.67	 2.77	 2.77	
My	herd	is	susceptible	because	of	badgers	on	or	near	my	farm	 2010	 4.02	 4.34+++	 3.83	 3.78+++	 4.10+	
2014	 4.07	 4.19	 3.78	 3.79+++	 4.09	
It	is	a	matter	of	luck	if	my	herd	goes	down	with	bTB	(reversed	scale)	 2010	 2.22	 2.29	 2.28	 2.15	 2.26	
2014	 2.33	 2.56	 2.73+++	 2.39	 2.31	
My	chances	of	getting	TB	are	lower	if	I	follow	what	other	farmers	in	
the	area	do	
2010	 2.73	 2.90	 2.57	 2.78	 2.69	
2014	 2.84	 2.83	 2.73	 2.87	 2.77	
Without	Fence	off	badger	latrines	 2010	 91.8%	 90.4%	 83.6%	-	 93.9%	 92.1%	
2014	 83.0%	**	 79.5%	 70.4%	--	 86.0%	 81.7%	
Without	Fence	off	badger	setts	 2010	 81.7%	 72.6%	--	 70.9%	-	 85.2%	 80.0%	
		 10	
2014	 79.4%	 75.3%	 64.8%	--	 83.3%	 81.1%	
Without	Secure	buildings	from	badgers	 2010	 62.1%	 57.5%	 67.3%	 62.3%	 59.0%	
2014	 56.7%	 56.2%	 55.6%	 57.9%	 54.6%	
Without	Badger	Proof	Feed	Stores	 2010	 30.9%	 30.1%	 40.0%	 34.8%	 28.3%	
2014	 42.9%	**	 43.8%	 44.4%	 44.7%	 41.7%	
Without	Raised	Feed	and	water	troughs	 2010	 40.6%	 36.1%	 40.0%	 44.3%	 38.2%	
2014	 47.7%	 41.1%	 40.7%	 56.1%	--	 43.9%	
Notes:	
Within-year	comparisons	(Independent	samples	t-test	/	Mann-Whitney	U	test)		
-	/	+	sig.	p<0.05	
--	/	++	p<0.01	
---	/	+++	p<0.001	
	
2010-2014	Comparisons	(Paired	samples	t-test	/	Wilcoxon	sign	test)	
*	sig.	p<0.05	
**	p<0.01	
***	p<0.001	
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Table	10:	Results	–	Negative	binomial	with	log	link	Generalised	Linear	Model	for	2014	On-Farm	Movements,	p-values	<	0.05	are	shown	in	
bold	
	
 ALL	RESPONDENTS	 NOT	IN	VACCINATION	AREA	 IN	VACCINATION	AREA	
Parameter	 	 	 95%	Wald	
Confidence	
Interval	for	Exp(B)	
	 	 95%	Wald	
Confidence	
Interval	for	Exp(B)	
	 	 95%	Wald	
Confidence	
Interval	for	Exp(B)	
	 Sig.	 Exp(B)	 Lower	 Upper	 Sig.	 Exp(B)	 Lower	 Upper	 Sig.	 Exp(B)	 Lower	 Upper	
(Intercept)	 <0.001	 6.232	 3.011	 12.897	 <0.001	 6.023	 2.318	 15.646	 0.169	 0.167	 0.013	 2.139	
Never	Fenced	Setts	 0.039	 0.569	 0.333	 0.972	 0.108	 0.545	 0.260	 1.142	 0.751	 1.236	 0.334	 4.581	
Fenced	Setts	in	2014	but	not	2010	 0.010	 0.415	 0.213	 0.809	 0.022	 0.320	 0.121	 0.850	 0.726	 1.234	 0.381	 3.994	
Always	Fenced	Setts	 <0.001	 0.279	 0.138	 0.563	 0.035	 0.336	 0.122	 0.924	 0.110	 0.304	 0.071	 1.308	
Stopped	Fencing	Setts	in	2014	a	 .	 1.000	 .	 .	 .	 1.000	 .	 .	 .	 1.000	 .	 .	
Herd	size	2010	 <0.001	 1.267	 1.133	 1.417	 0.021	 1.171	 1.024	 1.339	 <0.001	 3.003	 1.654	 5.453	
Herd	Size	2014	 <0.001	 1.329	 1.170	 1.510	 <0.001	 1.411	 1.193	 1.669	 0.486	 1.136	 0.793	 1.628	
No.	Reactors	2010	 0.464	 1.046	 0.927	 1.180	 0.084	 1.136	 0.983	 1.311	 0.374	 0.847	 0.588	 1.220	
No.	Reactors	2014	 <0.001	 1.392	 1.231	 1.574	 <0.001	 1.336	 1.143	 1.562	 0.732	 1.066	 0.740	 1.535	
No.	on-farm	cattle	movements	2008-10	 0.007	 1.152	 1.040	 1.277	 0.006	 1.192	 1.051	 1.353	 0.118	 1.227	 0.949	 1.587	
In	Vaccination	Area	 0.021	 1.580	 1.070	 2.334	 .	 1.000	 .	 .	 .	 1.000	 .	 .	
Dairy	Herd		 <0.001	 3.539	 2.443	 5.125	 <0.001	 2.639	 1.668	 4.173	 0.015	 3.347	 1.261	 8.882	
Vaccine	Acceptability	 0.157	 1.131	 0.954	 1.341	 0.213	 1.140	 0.928	 1.401	 0.678	 0.910	 0.582	 1.422	
Vaccine	General	Affective	Evaluation	 0.001	 0.728	 0.600	 0.884	 0.133	 0.839	 0.667	 1.055	 0.072	 0.620	 0.368	 1.044	
Vaccine	Effectiveness	 0.162	 1.126	 0.953	 1.330	 0.446	 1.086	 0.879	 1.342	 0.621	 1.122	 0.712	 1.767	
Vaccine	Responsibility	 <0.001	 1.332	 1.138	 1.558	 0.005	 1.291	 1.079	 1.546	 0.099	 1.418	 0.937	 2.147	
Vaccine	Self-Efficacy	 0.006	 0.841	 0.744	 0.951	 0.624	 0.960	 0.814	 1.131	 0.089	 0.788	 0.598	 1.037	
Vaccine	Social	Norms	 0.405	 1.054	 0.931	 1.195	 0.355	 1.068	 0.929	 1.229	 0.774	 0.938	 0.606	 1.453	
Disease	Susceptibility	 0.041	 0.875	 0.769	 0.994	 0.743	 1.030	 0.863	 1.229	 0.004	 0.668	 0.509	 0.877	
Trust	in	Government:	Commitment	 0.977	 1.002	 0.875	 1.147	 0.800	 0.979	 0.829	 1.155	 0.189	 1.258	 0.893	 1.772	
Trust	in	Government:	Competency	 0.471	 1.053	 0.916	 1.210	 0.447	 1.068	 0.901	 1.266	 0.819	 0.947	 0.595	 1.508	
		 12	
Notes:		
a	This	category	is	the	baseline	against	which	“Never	fenced	setts”,	“Fences	setts	in	2014	but	not	2010”	and	“Always	fenced	setts”	are	compared.		
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